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Leadership and Stakeholding 
Thom Brooks 
 
Forthcoming in Jacqueline Boaks and Michael Levine (eds), Leadership and Ethics. London: 
Bloomsbury Academic, 2015, pp. 199—210.  
 
 
Introduction 
What is the nature of leadership? This question has perhaps never had more importance than 
in recent days. While there are a great many self-professed ‘leader’ working in industry, 
politics and other areas, there might appear to be a growing disconnect between our common 
expectations from leaders and the varieties of alleged leadership on display. The recent global 
banking crisis is one of many examples where there were plenty of leaders, but arguably too 
little leadership. Virtually everyone was affected, but yet there was little accountability. This 
has helped contribute to eroding public confidence in our institutions and in the ability of our 
elected governments to regulate them satisfactorily. 
 There is a need to clarify the concept of leadership in light of these crises exposing 
three key elements: leadership as sustainable providing stability, leadership as accountable to 
enable transparency and leadership as ethical to set normative limits for what is permissible. I 
examine in this chapter these elements as built around an important principle of stakeholding. 
This can be stated briefly as the claim that those who have a stake should have a say about 
outcomes affecting them. I argue below that stakeholding is central to leadership because it 
helps identify how it can be sustainable, accountable and ethical. Each of these three key 
elements is examined in turn. It has been argued before that stakeholding theory can offer a 
persuasive view about business ethics.  
My account here is distinctive because I transform a concept found in that literature 
and develop it as a principle of justice, and a principle that confirm sound leadership. 
Stakeholding is not merely about the good management of others or a process, but an 
important part of leadership—and being a leader—as well. The idea of leadership needs to be 
reconfigured to some extent, or rather it reconceptualised to better track the qualities that 
leadership should possess. My argument is that stakeholding is useful for bringing out these 
qualities—leadership as sustainable, accountable and ethical—in a powerful restatement. 
 
Leadership as sustainable 
So how does stakeholding inform a compelling understanding about leadership? The first 
step is to consider the roots of stakeholding in stakeholder theory. These roots are closely 
associated with the still growing literature on business ethics and corporate governance 
(Freeman, et al 2010; Kaler 2003; Plender 1997). This research originated with R. Edward 
Freeman’s Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach published in 1984 and later 
popularised further by Will Hutton’s defence of ‘the stakeholder economy’ (Freeman 1984; 
Hutton 1995). These early accounts of stakeholder theory argued for a new alternative to the 
orthodox views about business and its management.  
 One orthodox view is that firms exist purely for profit creation to benefit their 
shareholders. According to Hutton, this view of firms is that they adopt the mind-set that 
‘they eat what they can kill’ where every penny of income generated is considered to be 
theirs and theirs alone.
1
 The firm as profit creator attempts to eat everything it can in its path 
and never fully satisfied.  
 The orthodox view suffers from several problems. One is it does not aim for 
sustainability. The firm’s attempts at profitable growth are measured in the short-term. Firms 
engorge themselves today without much thought for tomorrow. Firms do not aim primarily at 
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self-perpetuation, but profitability. A second problem is a lack of accountability: if the firm 
aims to increase profits, then it is thought this helps drive us towards greater efficiencies. 
These often include a more ‘efficient’ leadership structure—or, in other words, a top-down 
structure where decisions are made at the top by a few and distributed to the many below. 
Such a structure prioritises swift decision-making over transparent, collective decision-
making. A final problem is the lack of ethics: there seem few normative constraints on a 
firm’s activity beyond that which makes it possible. But can such problems be addressed 
without sacrificing enterprise and entrepreneurial activities? 
 Stakeholder theory arises as an alternative meant to provide answers to problems 
faced by the orthodox view. It defends a new model for firms that provides for stability, 
enables transparency and sets normative limits on their activities. This theory puts 
stakeholders, not profits, at its heart. Stakeholders are defined simply as those who have a 
stake in outcomes: each is a partner engaged in a shared project actively promoting some 
shared conception of the good. Instead of understanding the firm then as about generating 
profits (and so focusing on how profits can be maximised), stakeholder theory views the firm 
as the collective activity of stakeholders and so focuses on their relevant relationships to each 
other. The idea of the stakeholder economy sets out a new alternative for more than the 
management of any single firm, but a perspective on how a centre-left view of economic 
justice might be forged (Freeman, et. al. 2007; Hutton 1999; Hutton 2010). 
 One central idea motivating stakeholding is sustainability. Stakeholding is only 
opposed to profit maximisation when it is pursued for its own sake—and not for its 
stakeholders. A wide variety of people have a stake in the success in a firm. These include 
those who work for it, but also their dependents and the firms that do business with it. The 
state also has a stake in the success of its firms as a means to secure economic growth as well 
as tax revenues. For stakeholder theory, shareholders are not the only ones who count. This is 
because shareholders do not exclusively have a stake in the success of a firm. 
 So stakeholding rejects the idea that the firm should aim to accumulate as much as it 
can for those in the firm; but, instead, defends the view that firms should benefit stakeholders. 
This shift from the focus on benefitting shareholders to stakeholders is a move away from 
short-termism to sustainability. Why? Consider the Profit-Only Firm. Its focus—and 
identity—is bound up in its profit creation. If market conditions brought this to an end, then 
supporters of the orthodox view might exclaim, ‘So what?’ Where firms fail to be profitable, 
they die and this is how markets develop over time. Now consider the Stakeholder Firm. Its 
focus is on its stakeholders. Many of those with the larger stakes will work directly for the 
firm, but not all stakeholders do. This leads to a very different outcome whereby if its future 
became threatened this would become a problem. This is not because stakeholder theory 
claims what exists today must or should exist in future. Instead, the failure of firms to remain 
sustainable is a problem where they fail to benefit stakeholders. If Profit-Only Firms die, 
there are other firms to turn to. When Stakeholder Firms are under threat, the problem is not 
only one for those in the firm, but rather all those with a stake in its continuation. 
Sustainability matters and has an importance for the firm as a firm organised by stakeholders. 
 This has clear relevance for leadership. The Profit-Only Firm view of leadership is 
built around a (too) narrow consequentialism where managerial decisions are legitimated and 
supported by their ability to contribute to profitability. If this firm were to fail at securing 
profits, then this structure could not be sustained nor might the firm continue to exist. This 
form of leadership is maxmising and future-oriented, but short-term.  
 The Stakeholder Firm view of leadership is inclusive and long-term, accounting for 
backward-looking and forward-looking considerations. If leadership is about stakeholding, 
then it must be inclusive to bring together relevant stakeholders. Decision-making cannot also 
be solely focused on this firm and its promotion either. This is because there are stakeholders 
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outside the firm, persons with a stake in the firm’s outcomes. The stakeholder model of 
leadership is not a view of how one should decide matters for all, but how all who have a 
stake can feed into a sustainable, decision-making process.  
Those who have a stake should have a say. The issue is then how best to enable such a 
structure to ensure it is workable and delivers sustainability. We turn to this in the next 
section. 
 
Leadership as accountable 
Stakeholder leadership is about more than ensuring sustainability, but securing 
accountability. Consider again the orthodox view if the Profit-Only Firm. Accountability in 
that sphere is about an accountability to shareholders to deliver on short-term profit creation. 
Those in executive positions benefit most because they are accountable to shareholders for 
the decisions made. Of course, executives cannot claim the greatest rewards for taking the 
biggest risks, as the burdens of profitability can often take the form of restructuring and 
efficiency-savings leading to most job losses endured by those not on the executive team. To 
be accountable is not so much to be held to account in general—otherwise, more might share 
in the success (or failure) of the firm rather than benefits moving only to the top and not the 
bottom of the managerial structure. 
 Notice that this view of accountability is largely post facto, or ‘after the fact’. We 
hold executives to account for the decisions reached after we witness their outcomes. 
Accountability is about examining the outcomes of decisions already made. To be held to 
account is to be judged for actions already performed. 
 Compare this with the view of the Stakeholder Firm. Accountability here is diffused 
and spread out across all stakeholders. This view rejects the idea that the executive is 
accountable only to its shareholders because they are not the only persons with a stake in the 
future success of the firm. Stakeholders include a wider range of people than firm employees 
and shareholders alone. Likewise, the stakeholder view of leadership is a more expansive 
view about the leader’s decision-making and its outcomes.  
But what does it mean to be ‘accountable’ in this way? One central idea is the 
importance of transparency. If those who have a stake should have a say in outcomes that 
may affect them, this requires these stakeholders to possess sufficient information. Each must 
have access to information about available and likely outcomes. So it is not enough that 
information is ‘out there’; it must also be accessible to persons as stakeholders. Transparency 
is necessary for accountability because all potentially relevant information must be made 
available and accessible.  
This point can be clarified by an example. In his Philosophy of Right, G. W. F. Hegel 
defends the right to trial by jury on a distinctive ground, namely, transparency (Brooks 2013: 
94—95). He argues that juries are required because without them: 
knowledge [Kenntnis] of right and of the course of court proceedings, as well as the 
ability to pursue one’s rights, may become the property of a class [Stand] which 
makes itself exclusive . . . by the terminology it uses, inasmuch as this terminology is 
a foreign language for those whose rights are at stake (Hegel 1990: §228). 
The difference between a judge-only trial versus a jury trial is not the amount of information 
available, but its accessibility. Each might present the same evidence and raise the same legal 
issues. However, genuine accountability is not achieved through mere exposure to 
information. The judge-only trial is problematic because it risks becoming an event where 
only the legally trained can access the reasons supporting trial outcomes. The jury trial better 
guarantees the trial’s procedures and outcomes will be accessible to the defendant because his 
or her peers are similarly situated (insofar as all lack full legal knowledge) and so the 
decisions reached by a group of 12 such citizens can serve as a good barometer for what we 
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can and should expect most defendants to understand (Brooks 2004). In other words, we 
require accessibility to secure accountability.  
 This impacts on our understanding of leadership because it cannot be about 
accountability where those who have a stake in outcomes are unable to access the relevant 
information to support their decision-making. Consider one illustration of what is often 
thought to be political leadership: the ready availability of information online about 
government-related activities. This has certainly had a welcome effect of exposing political 
decision-making to greater scrutiny, but there remains the possibility of the general public 
becoming overwhelmed by the sheer volume of available information. The problem is much 
of this matter may be relatively inaccessible: we all might have opportunities to consider such 
material, but many of us might lack sufficient knowledge to engage with others. Leadership 
should view the availability of information as undermined by any lack of accessibility: the 
two go hand-in-hand. Stakeholding is not only about bringing together people who are 
stakeholders, but engaging with them as stakeholders. 
 This speaks to particular form of relationship between stakeholders. This is complex 
and part of the criticism faced by stakeholder theory (Prabhakar 2004). The main worry is 
simple: who are the stakeholders? (Kaler 2002). For example, it is not obvious that corporate 
partners of any single firm form an exclusive stakeholder group. This is because these 
partners are not alone in sharing a stake in that firm’s future performance. The problem about 
who to include is then also a problem about numbers: how many stakeholders are there? 
Stakeholder theory’s defenders, such as Will Hutton, claim we’re all stakeholders: 
‘companies should be run and managed balancing the interests of shareholders, customers, 
employees and wider society, rather than prioritising shareholders’ (2010: 151). We are all 
stakeholders in the firm’s future success occupying various different roles, such as the 
workforce, the senior management, customers, supply firms, the families of each and wider 
economy.  
 But if we’re all stakeholders, how can firms make any decisions? The answer lies in 
variable power distribution. To say many, if not all, have some stake in outcomes potentially 
affecting them if not to say every person has an equal share or that the outcome effects from 
decisions will be shared equally. Some will have more of a stake than others. Some might 
have different stakes depending upon other factors. So perhaps persons running a firm have a 
largest stake and even the largest say about outcomes. This does not mean they can or should 
avoid consulting with all other stakeholders. 
 Restorative justice conferencing is a useful illustration of stakeholding in practice 
(Brooks 2012: 65—68, 71—73, 77—84). Restorative justice is an alternative to the formal 
trial procedure for determining sentencing outcomes for criminal offenders.
2
 Instead of a trial, 
restorative justice aims to provide a context for healing between offenders and their victims 
as well as others. This is done by bringing together the offender, victim, their support 
networks (often a spouse or close friend) as well as individuals from the local community 
conducted by a trained facilitator. The victim speaks first to express the impact of a crime on 
him or her. Others speak with the offending going last. The meeting is predicated on the 
offender accepting guilt for the crime and often the offender will apologise to the victim. The 
benefits of restorative justice have been impressive: it delivers higher participant satisfaction 
for all participants, can lead to up to 25% less recidivism and can save £1 for every £9 spent 
(Brooks 2012: 83). 
 Restorative justice conferencing is a form of stakeholding. It brings together persons 
who have a stake in outcomes. This includes the victim, the offender, their close family and 
friends, but also the general public. Yet, it is clear that some have greater stakes than others. 
For instance, victims and offenders might each be thought to have the largest stakes: the 
victim as someone subjected to a public wrong and the offender as a person that will be 
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punished. It is admittedly difficult to come to any clear view about the number of other 
potential stakeholders—including ‘the public’ of you and me—who may be affected by the 
criminal justice system’s outcomes beyond ensuring the conference’s workability. 
 Crucially, all participants to a restorative justice conference have a say on its 
outcome; namely, the punishment of the offender. These stakeholders have a stake and so can 
engage with other stakeholders about outcomes. This renders restorative justice unique: 
instead of the top-down decision-making by judges and magistrates in court, restorative 
justice is a more collaborative enterprise where different stakeholders engage each other to 
create outcomes that can be shaped by this engagement. Each is also accountable to each 
other through practical reasoning about outcomes.
3
 
 Stakeholding brings out the dimension of accountability that is an important part of 
leadership. Stakeholder accountability requires transparency, but also engagement that is 
effective without requiring a hierarchical structure. Restorative justice is not a mere analogy, 
but an example of stakeholder accountability in practice. It illustrates a model whereby 
persons with stakes in outcomes should—and do—have a say about them engaging with 
others as fellow stakeholders. The restorative justice model is one example of how both the 
process and its outcomes can benefit from a stakeholder model. 
 
Leadership as ethical 
There is also an ethical dimension to the kind of accountability that stakeholding supports. 
This is aimed at setting normative limits for what is permissible. Leadership is not merely 
occupying a privileged position and maintaining it (e.g., sustainability). Nor is leadership 
only providing decisions that are publically accessible in a transparent process (e.g., 
accountability). Leadership requires that sustainability and accountability work in certain 
ways that bring out normative implications. 
 The ethics of the Profit-Only Firm is simple: rightness and wrongness are not central; 
profit creation is all that counts. So corners can be cut and perhaps long-term sustainability 
sacrificed in the blind pursuit of maximising profitability for today. Pursuing profits lacks 
sufficient normative constraints. Any such constraints that are used might endorse different 
goals. For example, market regulations may undermine profit creation for a firm in the short-
term in the name of securing other goods, such as a more sustainable market.  
 The Stakeholder Firm views things starkly different. Effective leadership is not only 
about ensuring the firm can continue to benefit its stakeholders, but undertaken as an exercise 
in stakeholding. So it is not only important to identify the relevant persons: we must also 
ensure a certain relationship between them. This is described by Hutton as fundamentally 
about inclusion where this is ‘not a one-way street’ and demands reciprocal obligations 
(1999: 74; see Fassin 2012). 
 Stakeholders must engage one another as stakeholders. What is its importance? 
Consider Philip Pettit’s ground-breaking work on republicanism (2001). Pettit argues that 
citizens must engage each other with ‘discursive control’ through shared, deliberative 
interaction where each has the ability and opportunity to contribute (2001: 70). Each person 
‘must be able to see their own signature’ in their attitudes and actions (Pettit 2001: 79). To 
enjoy discursive control, our freedom is secured where we satisfy an ideal of non-domination 
and not subjected to arbitrary interference (Pettit 2001: 138). 
 Stakeholding is compatible with republican freedom. Citizens exercising discursive 
control free from domination engage others as free and equal stakeholders. Each has a stake 
in outcomes and so each should be able to enter deliberations about how these outcomes are 
decided. A stakeholder is a citizen who enjoys freedom as non-domination. 
 However, stakeholding further develops republican freedom. Republicans, such as 
Pettit, claim that there is not one political discourse, but several with different memberships. 
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No one might be a member in all, but some may have memberships across more than one 
(Pettit 2001: 72). But which public discourses are there and who ought to be recognised as 
participants? Stakeholding offers an answer. Different areas of public life may include 
various memberships that reflect the multiple stakes citizens might have in each. Public 
affairs—to be ‘public’—affect us all and so we each have some stake in their outcomes. 
Some stakes may be greater than others.  
For example, public funding for the arts concerns everyone, but some, such as artists 
and musicians, might have greater stakes than others. Criminal justice is of public concern, 
but some, such as defendants and victims, may possess greater stakes than others, too. Precise 
determinations about relative stakes in every case might be difficult and hotly contested. 
Nonetheless, stakeholding can offer some insight into distinguishing between different 
discursive groups and their members more clearly than republicanism. This is because 
stakeholding claims those who have a stake should have a say and so provides a principled 
view on group membership.
4
 
 Stakeholding further develops republican theories in another respect. Republicanism 
claims non-domination is secured through discursive control: citizens enjoy republican 
freedom where they can exercise an opportunity for dialogue without arbitrary interference. 
Republicans mistake the opportunities to exercise discursive control for non-domination. The 
idea is that citizens should be held accountable and lack a right to complain should they fail 
to exercise available opportunities. But my only having opportunities is insufficient. Citizens 
must see themselves as stakeholders. If they fail to see their having a stake, then they may be 
insufficiently motivated to have a say even where opportunities for public deliberation are 
widely available. Citizens must have an interest as stakeholders to incentivize their public 
deliberation.  
 This raises a special problem for stakeholding. I have argued that providing 
opportunities for stakeholding is insufficient: individuals must possess a conviction about 
their being stakeholders. The problem is whether it is more tolerable to have opportunities for 
the exercise of stakeholding where many citizens fail to acquire this belief or instead a polity 
where many share the conviction they are stakeholders, but where opportunities are more 
limited. The criticism directed at republicanism is that it can be satisfied by the former 
without regard for the latter: what matters most is the existence in fact of opportunities. This 
does not deny the importance for ensuring citizens are aware of these opportunities, but 
convictions about stakeholding are much less important. However, both elements are 
necessary for stakeholding to become manifest: citizens should understand themselves as 
stakeholders with sufficient opportunities to exercise stakeholding.  Nonetheless, beliefs are 
important for stakeholding in a way they are not for republicanism. If citizens are to enjoy 
freedom as non-domination, then they must see themselves as non-dominated which 
stakeholding can help secure. 
 Alienation is perhaps the greatest concern for stakeholding. Someone who is alienated 
lacks the sense of self as connected and engaged with others. But this can only be a problem 
if our social and political world is worth having. For stakeholding, it is not only important 
that people are seen as stakeholders, but that they see themselves in this light.
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Conclusion: leadership as stakeholding? 
I have argued for a new model of leadership from a different perspective. I have focused on 
stakeholding: this is the idea that those who have a stake should have a say about outcomes. 
This idea finds original expression in the business ethics and corporate governance literature, 
but it is an idea that has applications elsewhere. Stakeholding is about more than a 
compelling alternative to structuring the decision-making process of firms, but it can also 
provide us with significant insights for leadership. 
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 The first claim is that leadership is about sustainability. When we consider what 
leadership means, many of us will think of someone who maintained a position of leadership 
that was maintained. Stakeholding makes clear a new way of thinking about sustainability 
whereby it is one of several goals and not to be considered in isolation from them.  
 The second claim is that leadership is about accountability. This is often thought to 
mean those who decide are held to account after decisions have been made. We effectively 
reward and punish when speaking about ‘accountability’ for decisions already made in the 
past. Stakeholding argues that accountability must include accessibility and that the process 
can be as important as its outcome. Leadership is not only about effective decision-making, 
but follows an interactive engagement with others who have a stake in outcomes, too. 
Crucially, stakeholders must not only be able to access available information, but it must be 
accessible for them to truly engage with others as stakeholders. 
 Finally, the third claim is sustainability and accountability are exercised within clear 
normative boundaries. It is important that not only should stakeholders have opportunities to 
exercise stakeholding, but they must be able to view themselves as stakeholders. This rests on 
a larger question about whether our social and political world is a world worth having a stake 
in. This larger, background issue is highly relevant, but beyond the confines of my discussion 
here.  
 Nonetheless, I have argued for a new view of leadership and ethics.
6
 Stakeholding is 
more than a metaphor imported from a different literature, but has clear relevance for how we 
think about leadership and related issues of justice. Leadership is best conceived as a form of 
stakeholding. This chapter has tried to explain this case. 
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1
 See http://www.totalpolitics.com/print/5558/its-not-big-but-fair-will-hutton.thtml. 
2
 Restorative justice has other applications, but I will focus only on its use in the criminal justice system for this 
example. 
3
 Restorative justice is also interesting because of its ability to address ‘penal pluralism’ in a new way. Penal 
pluralism is the idea that punishment can and should possess multiple penal purposes (Brooks 2014a). So 
instead of having to select either retributivist desert, deterrence or rehabilitation, penal pluralism seeks to 
integrate them together into a ‘unified theory of punishment’ (Brooks 2012: 123—48). Restorative justice can 
have a unified character by supporting multiple penal purposes, such as desert (ensuring punishment to only 
those confirming their guilt), deterrence (providing penalties sufficiently strong to dissuade others from 
engaging in similar activities), rehabilitation (focusing on tackling factors linked with reoffending) and others 
(Brooks 2014b). 
4
 My account of stakeholding is normative. As such, it is meant to apply across multiple areas—and I do not 
believe it is limited to leadership alone. I have already noted the relevance of stakeholding for business ethics 
and discussed its relation to political and economic justice. But should associations and non-public forms of 
community and organisation adopt some kind of stakeholder model? Possibly yes, if it can be agreed that is 
sufficiently valuable to engage others as stakeholders in these domains. 
5
 A critic might respond that what I refer to is merely ‘consultation’, but this is not the case. To be consulted 
does not require that I provide feedback, or that my feedback is taken seriously or that I am engaged as someone 
with a stake. Instead, my standing may be nothing more than the receiver of a mass distributed communique. 
Stakeholding refers to something much deeper regarding the relational engagement between participating 
individuals and their self-identities as stakeholders who reciprocally recognise each other as stakeholders. 
6
 Should leadership depend on ‘success’? I do not think so. My stakeholder account defends a principled 
normative approach. While consequences matter, I’m unpersuaded they should be the sole metric for 
determining success. This is, in part, because consequences may be shaped by effective and justifiable 
leadership without being determined by it. So normatively ‘good’ leadership cannot be judged on outcomes 
alone, but how these are pursued. The stakeholder account attempts to deliver satisfactory results, but focussing 
first and foremost on the processes that produce them. 
